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In August 2018, service members from many nations were represented in the Ukrainian Independence Day parade. Joint 
Multinational Training Group-Ukraine has been ongoing since 2015 and seeks to contribute to Ukraine’s internal defense 
capabilities and training capacity. (Tennessee Army National Guard)
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On the “Gerasimov Doctrine”
Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to 
the Punch
By Ofer Fridman
The first week of March 2019 was very exciting for Western experts on Russian military affairs. On March 2, the Russian Academy of Military Sciences held its annual defense conference with Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, giving the keynote address. Two days 
later, official Ministry of Defense newspaper Krasnaya Zvesda published the main outlines of Gerasimov’s 
speech, igniting a new wave of discourse on Russian military affairs among Western experts.1 The New 
York Times’ claim that “Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War” was aug-
mented by an interpretation claiming that Gerasimov had unveiled “Russia’s ‘strategy of limited actions,’” 
which was “a new version of the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’” that was to be considered the “semi-official ‘doc-
trine’ of the Russian Armed Forces and its General Staff.”2 Interestingly enough, this echo chamber–style 
interpretation of Gerasimov’s speech emphasized only the one small part of it that discussed information/
propaganda/subversion/nonmilitary aspects of war. The main question, however, is whether this part 
deserves such attention—after all, this topic was discussed only in one short paragraph entitled “Struggle in 
Informational Environment.” Was there something in his speech that deserved greater attention? And if so, 
why was it missed?
Did Russia Surprise the West? Or Was the West Surprised by Russia? 
Since 2014, Western experts on Russian military affairs have been trying to understand the Russian dis-
course on the character of war in the 21st century, as it manifested itself in Ukraine and later in Syria. These 
attempts produced several terms, such as “Gerasimov Doctrine” and “Russian hybrid warfare.”3 While these 
terms were initially popular in the professional and academic communities, they failed to endure. After all, 
Mark Galeotti, who introduced the term “Gerasimov Doctrine,” publicly apologized for coining the phrase, 
and, as Dmitriy Adamsky predicted, an attempt to utilize the Western concept of hybrid warfare to define 
the Russian approach to war resulted in an inaccurate analysis of Russian modus operandi.4 This attempt to 
understand Russian military thought through the Western conceptual prism has had two main intercon-
nected consequences. First, the West has been constantly failing to read the message coming from Moscow. 
Dr. Ofer Fridman is a Lecturer in War Studies and Director of Operations at the Center for Strategic Communications in 
King’s College. Prior to embarking on an academic career, Dr. Fridman served 15 years in the Israel Defense Force.
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Second, as an outcome of this failure, it has been 
repeatedly surprised by Russia. Fiona Hill, director 
of the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United 
States and Europe, put it best in 2015: “Why are we 
constantly surprised? They [Russians] do all these 
things, and sometimes they do signal quite clearly, 
but we missed a lot.”5 
The Russian reaction to the Ukrainian crisis 
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was the first main 
surprise to the Western community. In January 
2014, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Defence 
College expert Heidi Reisinger stated that Russian 
military forces are “neither a threat, nor a partner,” 
claiming that: 
Many years of continual reform, under-
funding, and the devastating effects of 
demographic trends have led the Russian 
armed forces to a situation where even 
senior military personnel raise doubts about 
the ability to provide national defence 
without tactical nuclear weapons. . . . All 
this makes Russia’s military capabilities less 
efficient and hardly interoperable.6 
Just 10 months later, Reisinger’s assessment had 
entirely changed:
Russia’s recent behaviour and actions are 
often referred to as “Hybrid Warfare.” They 
have been an effective and sometimes sur-
prising mix of military and non-military, 
conventional and irregular components, 
and can include all kinds of instruments 
such as cyber and information operations. 
None of the single components is new; it is 
the combination and orchestration of dif-
ferent actions that achieves a surprise effect 
and creates ambiguity, making an adequate 
reaction extremely difficult, especially for 
multinational organisations that operate on 
the principle of consensus.7 
This surprise gave birth to the ill-fated terms 
“Gerasimov Doctrine” and “Russian hybrid war-
fare.”8 While these concepts tried to attribute to 
Moscow the invention of a new blend of military 
and nonmilitary (political, diplomatic, economic, 
informational, cyber and other) means and meth-
ods, there was in fact very little conceptual novelty 
in what the Kremlin did in Crimea.9 Moreover, 
an analysis of the conceptual roots of this idea in 
Russian academic, political, and military dis-
course “can be easily traced well back to the early 
2000s.”10 For some reason, the Western community 
of Russian experts completely missed this dis-
cussion—clear signals of a shift in the conceptual 
approach to war that were sent from Russia for 
more than a decade. 
In September 2015, Russia surprised the West 
again when president Vladimir Putin announced 
Russian intervention in Syria.11 Why Western politi-
cians and experts were so surprised by the Kremlin’s 
decision to intervene is unclear. On the tactical level, 
those who closely monitored Russian affairs could 
see the upcoming signs, since the transfer of military 
hardware and troops from Russia to Syria had begun 
already in August and was well reported by differ-
ent media outlets and social networks.12 But also on 
the strategic level, Moscow’s desire to play a greater 
role in international affairs had been signaled to 
the West since the early 2000s. While many experts 
refer to President Putin’s famous speech at the 
Munich Security Conference in 2007, a better exam-
ple of how Moscow had communicated this desire 
can be seen in a comparative analysis of Russian 
self-definition in its Foreign Policy Concepts.13 
While the 2000 concept cautiously stated that “the 
Russian Federation has a real potential for ensuring 
itself a worthy place in the world,” the 2008 con-
cept proclaimed Russia as “the largest Euro-Asian 
power . . . one of the leading States of the world and a 
permanent member of the [United Nations] Security 
Council.”14 Тhe 2013 concept already clearly stated 
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that “Russia’s foreign policy . . . reflects the unique 
role our country has been playing over centuries as 
a counterbalance in international affairs and the 
development of global civilization.”15 The inability of 
Western experts to comprehend (or to believe) this 
transformation in Russia’s position on the global 
arena is probably the main reason why they were 
surprised when the Kremlin decided to counterbal-
ance the West in Syria in 2015.
While Russian actions in Ukraine and Syria can 
be considered “strategic surprises,” in the past sev-
eral years the West also found itself surprised many 
times on the tactical level. One of the best exam-
ples was the demonstration of the T–14 Armata, a 
next-generation Russian main battle tank, during 
the 2015 Moscow Victory Day parade. The T–14 
appears to have caught Western military experts 
completely unprepared, as if they were unaware of 
its development—according to a United Kingdom 
military intelligence assessment, “The tank has 
caused a sensation.”16 The T–14 was so surprising 
to the Western militaries that its demonstration 
was followed by urgent calls to upgrade existing 
fleets of battle tanks.17 The main question, how-
ever, is why the demonstration of the T–14 during 
the 2015 parade was so surprising; after all, the 
Kremlin had never hidden its development. In 
2010, the Russian Ministry of Defense had stopped 
financing the development of the T-95 in favor of 
the Armata family of land armored vehicles.18 In 
2011, General Major Yuri Kovalenko, former first 
deputy of the main automotive-armored director-
ate of the Ministry of Defense, stated that by 2015, 
Russia would deploy a new main battle tank titled 
Armata.19 In 2012, Aleksander Sukhorukov, the first 
deputy of the Minister of Defense, promised that 
vehicles based on the Armata platform “might start 
first trials a year before the promised deadline.”20 
In 2013, Russian deputy prime minister Dmitri 
Rogozin announced that the new tank was to be 
presented in the classified section of the 2013 Russia 
arms exhibition in Nizhny Tagil.21 Moreover, since 
2012, military-oriented media in Russia had started 
to speculate about the characteristics of the new 
T–14 (most of which proved to be right).22 Why the 
T–14 was such a big surprise to the Western military 
is unclear, as the Russians had signaled not only the 
fact that they had developed a new tank but also its 
characteristics. It is unclear why the UK military 
intelligence was so excited about the fact that in the 
T–14, “a tank crew is embedded within an armored 
capsule in the hull front,” as General Kovalenko 
openly stated as early as 2012 that “a crew will be 
separated from the turret.”23 
Another “tactical” surprise for the West was 
Putin’s 2018 address to the Federal Assembly in 
which he declared that Russia had finished the 
development of hypersonic weapons.24 It seems 
inconceivable that Western intelligence agen-
cies had no idea that Russia was developing these 
armaments, especially considering that for a 
few years before Putin’s speech, the Ministry of 
Defense was openly stating that the development 
of hypersonic weapons was in its final stages.25 
It is unclear why Putin’s announcement that the 
multi-billion-dollar U.S. missile defense system is 
useless against new Russian missiles was so sur-
prising to the Western community.
These are just a few examples from a long series 
of “surprises” that the Kremlin has sprung upon 
the West in the past decade, but the reason for their 
success probably can be explained better by the 
Western inability to read and interpret (and believe 
in) the messages being sent by Moscow rather than 
by Russia’s intention to surprise the West. In other 
words, to answer American foreign affairs special-
ist Fiona Hill’s question, “Why are we constantly 
surprised?” we need to understand how the West 
perceives contemporary Russia and whether this 
perception helps to interpret Russia’s signals and 
allows the West to adequately meet and parry 
Russian actions. 
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(Mis)Understanding Russia 
The examples above clearly show that the Kremlin 
was trying to communicate its intentions to the West 
long before taking actions. The signals were clearly 
there. The question is whether there was somebody 
with sufficient insight to interpret these signals and 
powerful enough to change the Western percep-
tion of Russia as “an over-geared, under-invested, 
over-securitized, and under-legitimate” state.26 
As the last several years have proven, the percep-
tion of Russia as weak does not represent the trend. 
While many politicians and experts compared the 
Russian economy to those of Italy and Spain in an 
attempt to diminish the power of the Kremlin, this 
comparison is very misleading.27 After all, with the 
same budget as Italy or Spain, Russia has one of the 
most ambitious space programs, the biggest nuclear 
arsenal, and one of the most powerful militaries in 
the world. As Michael McFaul, former ambassador to 
Russia and senior advisor to President Barack Obama 
on Russian and Eurasian affairs, put it: 
The mistake that was made 20 years ago was 
assuming Russia’s a weak power, a declining 
power. Whether they’re a great power or a 
middling power, we can argue about. But they 
are a major power, in the top 5 or 10 econo-
mies in the world, a top nuclear country in the 
world and now, given the investment Putin’s 
made in the military, they’re one of the major 
military powers in the world. Those trends are 
not changing in the next 20 or 30 years.28 
Moreover, the assumption of a weak Russia mis-
leads and creates an unhelpful delusion regarding 
the state of Russian affairs, preventing the West 
from understanding the messages that the Kremlin 
attempts to communicate.
On the one hand, regarding the possibility of 
understanding Russia, it is difficult not to recall the 
famous verse written by Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev 
in 1866:
Russia cannot be known by the mind
Nor measured by the common mile:
Her status is unique, without kind— 
Russia can only be believed in.29 
On the other hand, an assumption that 
Russia “is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma” seems to be exaggerated; after making 
this famous statement, Winston Churchill con-
tinued: “But perhaps there is a key. That key is 
Russian national interest.”30 George Kennan in his 
“Long Telegram,” wrote: 
We must see that our public is educated 
to realities of Russian situation. I cannot 
over-emphasize importance of this. . . . I 
am convinced that there would be far less 
hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country 
today if realities of this situation were better 
understood by our people.31 
These words seem as relevant today as they 
were in 1946, but the reason why the West has been 
repeatedly surprised by the Kremlin is that Kennan’s 
recommendations were forgotten as soon as the 
Cold War ended. Since the end of the Cold War, 
the field of Russian studies has suffered significant 
losses. The U.S.-based Association for Slavic, East 
European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) stated in 
2015 that “Russian studies within the social sci-
ences are facing a crisis: an unmistakable decline 
in interest and numbers, in terms of both graduate 
students and faculty.”32 While ASEEES outlined sev-
eral different reasons for this decline, the main one 
was the decreased government funding for Russia-
related research, “including cuts of over 50 percent 
to critical language training, and near complete 
elimination of advanced research fellowships for 
Americans on Russia and the region.”33 In conclu-
sion of its analysis, ASEEES stated:
Due both to trends within political science 
away from area specific knowledge (and 
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in the direction of broader theoretical and 
comparative studies and more sophisticated 
quantitative methods) and to a decline in 
interest on the part of the American public 
and government in Russia following the end 
of the Cold War, there are fewer faculty in 
political science departments who work on 
Russia than there were even a decade ago 
and also fewer PhD students. This is the 
gravest crisis facing the field.34 
It is not surprising, then, that the West has 
been constantly caught off guard by Russia. Since 
the end of the Cold War, the West has lost interest 
in Russia, slowly losing the cadre of Russian experts 
able to understand and interpret signals sent from or 
actions conducted by the Kremlin. 
Resonating Kennan’s advice, Ivan Ilyin, a 
renowned Russian philosopher in exile, wrote in 
1944: “Russia, as a nation and culture, still appears 
to Western Europe as a hidden world, as a problem 
that cannot be understood, a kind of Sphinx.”35 
Unfortunately, this observation seems as relevant 
today as it was more than 70 years ago. In his book 
Should We Fear Russia? Dmitri Trenin, director 
of the Carnegie Moscow Center, concluded that 
“Russia should not be feared but, rather, always 
be handled with care.”36 Such “handling,” how-
ever, requires a deep knowledge of Russia’s history, 
culture, religion, and other aspects that have been 
shaping its social-political-military behavior since 
Ivan the Formidable’s reign in the 16th century to 
the present day. Without such knowledge, it is not 
only very difficult to stop fearing the unknown 
Russia, it is also impossible to understand any sig-
nals sent from the Kremlin in the form of words 
(speeches, articles, or doctrines) or deeds (from 
military interventions to deployment of a new 
A Russian Sukhoi SU-24 attack aircraft makes a low-altitude pass by the USS Donald Cook. A guided-missile 
destroyer, the Cook was conducting a routine patrol in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of national 
security interests in Europe. (U.S. Navy)
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piece of hardware). Without an understanding that 
Russia is “both strong and weak; authoritarian and 
lawless; traditionalist and valueless,” any analysis of 
Russia’s communications with the West would be 
too superficial, failing to read between the lines and 
misunderstanding the message.37
Back to General Gerasimov 
In 2013, General Valery Gerasimov published his 
famous article, “The Value of Science Is in the 
Foresight.”38 By interpreting (or misinterpreting)39 
Gerasimov’s article, many Western experts found 
in this article a conceptual rationale for Russian 
actions in Ukraine, dubbing it the Gerasimov 
Doctrine.40 However, the so-called Gerasimov 
Doctrine was neither by Gerasimov, nor was it 
doctrine. First, Gerasimov’s article was based 
on the writings of two Russian officers, Colonel 
Sergey Chekinov and Lieutenant General Sergey 
Bogdanov, whose joint publications on the chang-
ing nature of contemporary conflicts have played 
a vital role in shaping the views of the Russian mili-
tary establishment since the late 2000s.41 Second, 
regarding whether it was a doctrine, Mark Galeotti, 
who was responsible for the popularization of the 
term “Gerasimov Doctrine,” later recanted, saying 
that “it doesn’t exist. And the longer we pretend it 
does, the longer we misunderstand the—real, but 
different—challenge Russia poses.”42 
Moreover, despite the warnings of scholars 
who questioned the practicability and concep-
tual relevance of the Gerasimov Doctrine and the 
following idea of Russian hybrid warfare, many 
Western experts preferred to see how Gerasimov 
“envisions new forms and means of armed com-
bat . . . with the aim of achieving political and 
strategic objectives under the cover of ambigu-
ity.”43 While trying to explain “why Gerasimov’s 
statement that non-military means are four times 
as important than military means is relevant,” the 
West seems to have failed to see the forest for the 
trees; according to Gerasimov:
Regardless of the increasing importance of 
the non-military means in the resolution 
of interstate confrontations, the role of the 
armed forces, in providing the security of a 
state, is not decreasing, but only growing. 
Therefore, the requirements from the armed 
forces capabilities are [also] extending.44 
While Gerasimov’s speeches and articles were 
made and published in the context of Russia’s 
ongoing conceptual discourse on the role of the 
military in international confrontations, it seems 
that many Western interpreters of Gerasimov saw 
more what they wanted to see rather than what 
Gerasimov wanted to say. Since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the Russian conceptual debate on the 
nature of international confrontations was flooded 
by opinions that promoted the rising importance of 
nonmilitary means. This trend led many Russian 
military thinkers, including Gerasimov, to realize 
that the subsiding status of war as an armed conflict 
also meant the declining eminence of armed forces. 
While for most of this period the Russian military 
had avoided participating in this debate, the ris-
ing popularity of nonmilitary means and methods 
among Russia’s political leadership by the end of 
the 2000s forced the military to intervene. In other 
words, Gerasimov was not presenting “an expanded 
theory of modern warfare”45 or announcing a new 
Russian “vision of total warfare;” rather, he was 
outlining the need for adequate investment in the 
development and modernization of the Russian mili-
tary, its weapons and capabilities, in the context of an 
increasing belief among Russian political leadership 
that conflicts can be fought and won without the 
military.46 Therefore, as Charles K. Bartles rightfully 
points out, Gerasimov decided to publish his articles 
in the journal Military-Industrial Courier (Voyenno-
Promyshlennyy Kurier), as his intended audience 
was not the Russian armed forces, and definitely not 
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the Western audience, but “Russia’s senior political 
leadership.”47 Many Western experts generally failed 
to put Gerasimov into this context, spending time, 
money and much ink exploring the nonexistent 
“Gerasimov Doctrine” and allowing Russia to repeat-
edly surprise the West with its new hardware and 
military performance in Ukraine and Syria.
This year, Gerasimov’s speech at the Russian 
Academy of Military Sciences annual defense 
conference created another wave of attention to 
the “signature strategy of Russia under President 
Vladimir V. Putin . . . [that is] a mix of combat, intel-
ligence, and propaganda tools that the Kremlin has 
deployed in conflicts such as Syria and Ukraine.”48 
While this reaction was initiated by a short sum-
mary of Gerasimov’s speech published by Krasnaya 
Zvesda,49 his full address was published a few days 
later by Military-Industrial Courier.50 A closer exam-
ination of this article shows again that what many 
Western experts preferred to see in Gerasimov’s 
speech was not necessarily what Gerasimov wanted 
to say.
Summarizing his analysis of the 2013 
Gerasimov article, Bartles accurately concluded:
Gerasimov’s view of the future operational 
environment is in many ways very similar 
to our own. Like us, he envisions less large-
scale warfare; increased use of networked 
command-and-control systems, robot-
ics, and high-precision weaponry; greater 
importance placed on interagency cooper-
ation; more operations in urban terrain; 
a melding of offense and defense; and a 
general decrease in the differences between 
military activities at the strategic, opera-
tional, and tactical levels.51 
On the one hand, a summary of the 2019 arti-
cle would not be much different. On the other, 
Gerasimov discusses several important details that 
deserve special attention.
While many in the West interpret Gerasimov’s 
speech as another Russian attempt to pitch infor-
mation operations as a form of war, Gerasimov, in 
fact, pays very little attention to this topic. His speech 
included several references to the increasing role of the 
information dimension.52 For example, he stated that:
An analysis of the nature of contemporary 
wars has showed a significant increase in 
the importance of informational dimen-
sion. A new reality of future wars will also 
include the transfer of hostilities precisely 
into this area. Information technology 
essentially is becoming one of the most 
promising types of weapons.53 
However, anyone who is interested in the role 
of information operations (IO) on the battlefields 
of the 21st century would find that this understand-
ing is neither new nor particularly Russian. For 
example, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff share quite a 
similar view:
As the strategic environment continues to 
change, so does IO. Based on these changes, 
the Secretary of Defense now characterizes 
IO as the integrated employment, during 
military operations, of IRCs [informa-
tion-related capabilities] in concert with 
other lines of operation to influence, dis-
rupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making 
of adversaries and potential adversaries 
while protecting our own. This revised 
characterization has led to a reassessment 
of . . . how IRCs can be effectively inte-
grated into joint operations to create effects 
and operationally exploitable conditions 
necessary for achieving the joint force com-
mander’s objectives.54 
On the one hand, many Western interpreters of 
Gerasimov decided to emphasize how “Gerasimov 
accused the West of covert preparations to instigate 
108 |  FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 2
FRIDMAN
mass public protests and so-called ‘color revolu-
tions’ as well as of using ‘soft power’ to overthrow 
objectionable regimes in order to undermine and 
eventually destroy (break up) undesirable states.”55 
On the other, there is nothing new in this Russian 
rhetoric of the “evil West that tries to undermine 
Russia,” as it has been going for more than two 
decades.56 Therefore, the main value of Gerasimov’s 
speech seems to lie not with the repetition of this old 
narrative, but rather with other important details 
that may shed some light on the real state of affairs 
in the Russian military and possible directions of its 
development in the near future.
The first important detail Gerasimov gave was 
his call to learn the lessons of Russian involvement 
in Syria and develop a capability to implement what 
he calls “a strategy of limited action.” In his words:
Syrian experience has an important role 
in the development of strategy. Its gener-
alization and implementation allowed us 
to identify a new practical area. This area 
is the achievement of the aims related to 
protecting and advancing national interests 
outside the territory of Russia—a strategy 
of limited actions. The basis for its imple-
mentation is the creation of a self-sufficient 
group of troops (forces) based on the forma-
tions of one of the branches of the Armed 
Forces, which has high mobility and is able 
to make the greatest contribution to the 
achievement of the defined aims.57 
The second interesting fact Gerasimov provided 
was his assessment of the development and deploy-
ment of new Russian high-precision strike systems: 
Serial production of new models of arma-
ments and outfitting of the Armed Forces 
with them have begun. The “Avangard” 
[hypersonic glide re-entry vehicle], the 
“Sarmat” [intercontinental ballistic missile], 
and the newest “Peresvet” [laser cannon] 
and “Kinzhal” [air-launched hypersonic 
missile] weapons have shown their high effec-
tiveness, and the “Poseidon” [autonomous, 
nuclear-armed torpedo] and “Burevestnik” 
[nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise 
missile] complexes are going through suc-
cessful tests. Scheduled work is proceeding 
on creation of the “Tsirkon” hypersonic sea-
launched cruise missile.58 
He also assured that these modern capabilities are 
not another case of Russian pokazuha (a staged 
event for officials, international observers, and/
or domestic propaganda), as “the part of mod-
ern weapon systems in our nuclear capability has 
[already] reached 82 percent.”59 
Another important statistic given by Gerasimov 
was regarding the increasing level of professionalism 
among Russian forces:
Nowadays, we proceed with the fulfill-
ment of the planned program to staff the 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 
with contract servicemen. By the end of 
2025, their number will reach 475,000 
troops. . . . Today, the officer corps of the 
Armed Forces is staffed with trained pro-
fessional personnel. All commanders of 
military districts, combined-arms for-
mations, formations of the Air Force and 
Air Defense, as well as 96 percent of the 
commanders of combined-arms units have 
combat experience.60
Finally, he concludes with the call to continue 
investment in the modernization of the armed 
forces, as:
The modern weapons are so complex that it 
would be unlikely to adjust their production 
after the start of the hostilities. Therefore, 
everything necessary should be produced 
in the required quantity and be deployed 
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already in peacetime. We must, by all 
means, ensure technical, technological, and 
organizational superiority over any poten-
tial adversary.61 
While these four important observations by 
Gerasimov may seem to be quite separate, they in 
fact represent different pieces of one puzzle. There 
is one message that Gerasimov tries to commu-
nicate between the lines of his speech: that Russia 
needs to create doctrinal and material capability 
of a highly professional intervention force with the 
potential to act worldwide, under the protection of 
a highly effective, modernized nuclear umbrella. 
Interestingly enough, it seems that while Western 
experts identified this message, they almost 
immediately rejected it. For example, interpreting 
Gerasimov’s “strategy of limited actions,” Roger 
McDermott assessed that it “does not represent a 
declaration to conduct ‘power projection’ on a global 
scale, given Russia’s economic as well as military 
obstacles that would limit such ambitions.”62 And 
translating Gerasimov’s call to build and stock 
modernized weapons systems, Pavel Felgenhauer 
compared modern Russia to the Soviet Union, fore-
casting for the former the destiny of the latter: 
Building up vast stockpiles of tanks and 
other hardware in a vain attempt to achieve 
global military supremacy—as promoted for 
decades by the Soviet General Staff—pushed 
the mighty Soviet Union to economic and 
social ruin and eventual disintegration in 
1991. Gerasimov and the Russian Armed 
Forces are clearly not content to limit their 
ambitions. . . . Today, they are boldly chal-
lenging the entire world and pledging to 
build the biggest military they can. The end 
result may prove as devastating as in 1991.63 
The purpose of this article is not to sug-
gest that Gerasimov’s message (or anyone’s from 
the Kremlin) should be taken for granted. But 
dismissing them as too ambitious for a Russia 
that is “politically isolated, economically sanc-
tioned and with few options to improve its lot” 
does not seem right either. Punching above its 
weight is a sign of strong leadership in the Russian 
cultural-political-military context.64 As the past 
two decades show, the Kremlin has been quite 
consistent in delivering its promises, especially 
in the political-military sphere. The West has 
also been very consistent in dismissing Moscow’s 
promises, finding itself surprised time after time. 
Unfortunately, in analyzing how Gerasimov’s latest 
promise was discussed in the West, it is likely to 
follow the same path, and we all will be “surprised” 
in a few years when Russia will deploy an interven-
tion force to “protect” its interests abroad. 
Conclusion: Know Your Enemy 
Sun Tzu’s famous maxim asserts that “if you know 
the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear 
the result of a hundred battles.” While the topic of 
“knowing yourself” should be discussed separately, 
“knowing the enemy” is the very message of this 
article. During the Cold War, the West constantly 
overestimated the Soviet Union. The evidence of 
that was the level of surprise that the end of the Cold 
War and the following dissolution of the Soviet 
Union created in the West. Since the end of the Cold 
War, however, the West has constantly underesti-
mated the Kremlin. As it seems, even today, after 
Moscow has proven its ability on so many occasions, 
the West struggles to accept that the Kremlin may 
deliver what it promises.
This should not be interpreted as a call to return 
to Cold War practices. An overwhelming overesti-
mation of the enemy also has social, political, and 
economic prices that nobody in the West wants to 
(or should) pay. However, it is about time that the 
West starts taking Russia seriously—or, more pre-
cisely, perceiving Russia as it wants to be perceived. 
After all, as the current state of global affairs shows, 
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Russia’s self-perception is not far from the reality. 
For example, the Kremlin has been talking for years 
about the restoration of Russia’s role as a “counter-
balancing factor in international affairs.”65 As the 
events in Syria and Venezuela show, this factor has 
been well restored.66 
To truly understand Russia, the West should 
stop looking east through the prism of the Western 
worldview. There is no doubt that the Russian 
political system is different from the Western one, 
but it does not necessarily mean that it is weaker. 
During the 20th century, the Russian people proved 
twice that when they are truly unhappy with their 
leadership, they bring it down, regardless of the dev-
astating consequences. Anticipating that the Russian 
people will soon repeat this exercise is misleading, 
not only because the current leadership has learned 
the lessons of 1917 and 1991, but also because the 
memory of the 1990s is still too fresh in the hearts 
and minds of the Russian people. The West should 
accept the fact that Russia is a major power that is 
going to stay around, with Putin or without, protect-
ing its interests and, most importantly, delivering on 
its promises. Only through this prism will the West 
truly understand what messages are coming from 
the Kremlin and be prepared to beat Russia to the 
punch. PRISM
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